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Theoretical Restrictions on the Sharing of Indigenous 
Biological Knowledge: Implications for 
Freedom of Speech in Tribal Law 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher* 
Together, my parents and I stepped into our front yard and 
stared up into the sky. We saw the big planes roar noisily through the 
rough air above the reservation. We saw the soldiers step from the 
bellies of those planes and drop toward the earth. We saw a thousand 
parachutes open into a thousand green blossoms. All over the Spokane 
Indian Reservation, all over every reservation in the country, those 
green blossoms fell onto empty fields, onto powwow grounds, and onto 
the roofs of tribal schools and health clinics. 
*** 
"Jonah," said the white soldier. "We don't mean to hurt you. Or 
your parents. " 
"Yes, you do," I said. "You're going to eat us. You're going to 
drink our blood. " 
The white soldier'sface grew harder. Marble, granite, quartz. 
"Jonah," he said. "We've come to take you away from here. We 
need you." 
"I knew you were coming, " I said.! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sherman Alexie's short story, "The Sin Eaters," is a fable about an unknown 
contamination sweeping the United States that compels the federal government to 
abduct Indians of child-rearing years, taking them to a secret location for purposes of 
extracting some biological element unique to Indians.2 This story represents the fear 
that exists in virtually every comer of Indian country3 and in the territories of 
Indigenous peoples worldwide. The exploitation of Indigenous biological knowledge 
by non-Indian scientists and researchers has long haunted Indian communities. In large 
part due to the publication of Vine Deloria, Jr.' s scathing attack on anthropologists in 
his book Custer Died for Your Sins,4 and also due to the increasing international 
awareness of the rights of Indigenous peoples in both the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples5 and the Convention on Biological Diversity,6 
scientific research apparently has attempted to improve on its methods compared to the 
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abuses of the past. In spite of this improvement, the pressures to exploit Indigenous 
biological knowledge persist. 
The legal protections that Indians and Indian com~unities rriight draw upon for 
protection from these encroachments have received extensive scholarly attention. 
Professor Angela R. Riley's excellent argument that the Indian Commerce Clause7 and 
the trust relationship between the United States and the American Indian tribes8 
compel the government to enact an "Indian Copyright Act" is one salvo.9 Other 
scholars have written that federal environmental protection laws 10 and intellectual 
property laws 11 could protect Indigenous biological knowledge. Others, such as 
Professor Russel Lawrence Barsh, dispute that current federal and international laws 
are sufficient. 12 John Petosker wrote twenty years ago that the First Amendment would 
not protect tribal concerns1 and he was proven right in cases such as Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass 'n, 14 where the Supreme Court refused to 
extend First Amendment protection to Indian land used for religious purposes, and 
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, where the Supreme 
Court refused to extend First Amendment protection to the religious use of peyote. 15 
This Article brings forth the possibility that an American Indian tribe might 
legislate to prohibit the exportation and disclosure of Indigenous biological knowledge. 
Such legislation tends to implicate both the due process rights and free speech rights of 
tribal members and non-tribal members affected by such legislation. This Article, 
however, will focus on the· implications of the freedom of speech concerns resulting 
from such a prohibition or restriction. The impact on free speech - as well as the 
tribe's justification for such restrictions or prohibitions - best brings forth the 
arguments on the merits. 
Part I of this Article sets the table by defining what is meant by "Indigenous 
biological knowledge." That Part also provides examples on how that knowledge has 
been exploited by non-Indians in sometimes· extraordinarily negative ways. Part II 
illustrates the legal regimes currently available for Indian tribes to prevent this 
exploitation and how these regimes generally fail to adequately protect Indians and 
tribes. Part III describes civil rights jurisprudence in Indian Country, with a focus on 
freedom of speech. Part IV discusses a few of the possible tribal law responses to 
prevent the exportation of Indigenous biological knowledge. Part IV also analyzes the 
free speech implications of these theoretical legislative solutions in the context of tribal 
constitutional law on free speech guarantees. 
II. INDIGENOUS BIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
Professor Dean Suagee wrote that "[t]he cultures of American Indian tribes 
hold a wealth of knowledge about the natural world, knowledge that reflects the 
presence of tribal cultures in North America for countless generations .... ,,16 
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Michigan Indians have spoken at great length about how when white doctors came to 
their villages, they would have much to learn from the local Indians about medicine 
before they could claim to be equals as doctors. 17 In the modem era, Indigenous 
peoples routinely report that "corporations, government agencies and individual 
researchers [are] 'attempting to seize indigenous knowledge and its products for their 
own purposes.,,18 
A. Definition 
For purposes of this Article, "Indigenous biological knowledge" is defined 
broadly as: 
a body of knowledge built by a group of people through generations 
living in close contact with nature. It includes a system of classification, 
a set of empirical observations about the local environment, and a 
system of self-management that governs resource use.19 
It may also include "knowledge, possessed by indigenous people[s], in one or more 
societies and in one or more forms, including, but not limited to, art, dance and music, 
medicines and folk remedies, folk culture, biodiversity, knowledge and protection of 
plant varieties, handicrafts, designs, literature[,]"2o all "local ecological, agricultural, or 
medical knowledge,,,21 and knowledge that might encomEass or surpass "patent, 
trademark, design registration, and biodiversity rights." Indigenous biological 
knowledge is not static; it evolves and is constantly updated and invented by 
Indigenous peoples. 23 
The history of the United States includes a dark lining related to the scientific 
"value" of Indigenous biological knowledge.24 For example, "[i]n 1798, Thomas 
Jefferson ordered the excavation of Native American burial grounds, claiming he had 
the right to remove the remains 'by virtue of a higher order called science. ",25 
Anthropologists and archaeologists visited desert southwest Indian tribes and pueblos, 
"collect[ing] sacred paraphernalia, bribing destitute tribal members with money, 
thereby creating a new norm for the illegal selling of sacred items and creating a 
demand by outsiders for ethnographic materials.,,26 Medical doctors took test samples 
and conducted unnecessary kidney biopsies on Zuni Pueblo Indians without disclosing 
the results in the early 1980s.27 Smithsonian Institute anthropologists "came to White 
Earth and other reservations with scapulars in hand, and measured the heads of the 
Anishinaabeg of White Earth as part of tests designed to show a genetic basis for 
Natives' alleged intellectual inferiority.,,28 
Modem science appears to be more sensitive to the concerns of Indigenous 
peoples. The University of Washington School of Law's Native American Law 
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Program has recently partnered with that law school's Health Law Program and 
University's School of Medicine to "look at ethical and legal issues related to genetic 
research and Native Americans.,,29 Museums are also developing community-based 
models incorporating the experiences, knowledge, and preferences of tribal 
communities to modem collections.3o 
B. Examples Qf Exploitation 
Despite increasing sensitivity, the pressure from university and corporate 
researchers, New Age practitioners, and others to tap into Indigenous biological 
knowledge has become more intense. "Biopiracy" has been defined by one scholar as 
"the unauthorized extraction of traditional knowledge or biological resources and/or 
the patenting of 'inventions' that derive from such knowledge or resources without any 
provision for sharing the benefits with the providers.,,31 This article briefly describes 
two of the more well known examples that have occurred in North America. 
1. Human Genome Project 
The Human Genome Diversity Project has asked individual members of Indian 
tribes to provide biological samples in order to preserve for all time a tribe's DNA.32 
Indians often believe this project is a new form of "biocolonialism,,33 and often believe 
that the scientists view Indians as "the new biological goldmine.,,34 More specifically, 
Indigenous peoples often fear that genetic testing "would be used to rewrite their 
history in order to deny them access to land and other historical tribal claims ... [and] 
could redefine the status of individuals in terms of biological categories, categorizing 
them in ways that would influence their rights or entitlements.,,35 Others have argued 
that the exploitation of Indigenous biological materials for profit "might exacerbate 
disparities in the healthcare available to the wealthy and middle classes and that 
available to the medically underserved.,,36 Still others argue that focusing on 
Indigenous biological knowledge in the manner of preserving the allegedly soon-to-be 
"extinct" tribal DNA is insulting given the need to devote resources toward addressing 
the underlying causes of the future "extinction.'.37 
It appears likely that Indians will continue to be tar~ets of research, especially 
given that sampling and re-sampling is not uncommon. 8 Even so, according to 
Professor Russel Barsh, "most of the harm has already been done, from a community-
level perspective ... [g]roup privacy and property interests have already been 
compromised, and most of the material likely belongs to third parties who can allege 
ignorance in their defense ... .',39 
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2. Minnesota Wild Rice 
Researchers from the University of Minnesota began the process of 
domesticating wild rice from the Minnesota Chippewa tribes' lands in the 1950s -
without their consent.40 Winona LaDuke reported that "[d]omesticated wild rice was 
soon produced and then overproduced. The wholesale wild rice price dropped from 
$4.44 per pound in 1967 to $2.68 a pound in 1976.'.41 The Anishinaabeg fear that "the 
varieties developed by the University of Minnesota researchers [might] possibly 
contaminate the Anishinaabeg's wild rice strands[.]"42 The White Earth Land 
Recovery Project contends that "[ e ]verything about true wild rice is endangered: the 
indigenous varieties, the environments they need to flourish, the way of life that long 
drew Ojibwe families ... to save all of it.,,43 For the Minnesota Ojibwe, "wild rice is a 
sacred gift, and that ... [w ]ild rice-manoomin-is central to the Ojibwe creation 
stories.'M For Great Lakes Indians, wild rice harvesting was "an important ingredient 
of social and ceremonial life. ,,45 
C. Scientific Response to Criticism 
Policymakers tend to think of science as inherently good and useful, but 
(assuming that has any truth at all) Indigenous peoples look at science through the lens 
of people who "have faced a long history of discrimination, oppression, and 
genocide.,,46 For Indigenous peoples, any policy must take into consideration the 
collective rights to biological and cultural knowledge - a question that Western 
scientists rarely consider. As Professor Riley notes, "[t]he philosophical underpinnings 
of Western law ignore the stake that a group might have in a particular issue, and fail 
to adequately recognize a group's communal claim to continued existence.,.47 
A major concern for Indigenous peoples related to the research planned on their 
bodies is as follows: 
. . . the way genetic information can be misused to create and reify 
population stereotypes. As institutions create distinctions on the basis of 
genetic predispositions, individuals may be differentially treated, not 
because of their individual condition, but because of the predispositions 
attributed to their groUp.48 
Other commentators have noted that "[r]esearch-related harms to social groups can 
take many forms, including overt discrimination, stigmatization, unjust distribution of 
research benefits, and subtle disruptions of existing social relationships within 
participating communities.'.49 It's the last phrase that catches them the most unawares. 
Simply put, scientists and researchers have a difficult time seeing the harm to 
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Indian tribes and communities as a whole. They see and understand how individuals 
can be harmed, but fail to see how a community can be harmed. In their view, 
"[u]nlike potential harms to "individual sample contributors, which can be minimized 
through the removal of personally identifying information, harms to communities often 
cannot be easily addressed through anonymization since social identities are important 
analytic variables in many types of research."so And yet, for many scientists, 
"academic freedom" is all that matters.S1 
Moreover, none of the ethical guidelines used by researchers in their research 
on Indigenous communities and peoples "provide[] guidance on how to cope with 
circumstances when it may be unclear who speaks for a particular aboriginal 
community. Some aboriginal communities may have multiple representatives, for 
example, a traditional band council as well as an elected ... government."S2 In addition, 
"not all the guidelines clearly specify the process of obtaining informed consent from 
the community. "S3 
Absent consent obtained from an Indian' community, "documenting and/or 
disseminating their knowledge is surely morally wrong."S4 
D. Known Present and Future Sources of Biopiracy 
A few sources of bio-piracy are relatively well documented. One example is 
sometimes referred to as Big Pharma. These are large multinational corporations that 
constitute much of the driving force behind historical and continuing bio-piracy. 
According to. Professor Barsh, "Big Pharma is industry jargon for two dozen large, 
well established, vertically integrated, publicly traded multinational coworations that 
are capable of taking pharmaceuticals from 'lab' bench to bottle."'s Despite the 
concern over multinational corporate bio-piracy, these entities deny they have a 
significant impact or interest in exploiting Indigenous. biological knowledge. 
According to Dr. Robert Wolkow of Pfizer, the " ... hit rate from bioprospecting ... is 
extremely low, while the transaction costs are quite high."s6 Indigenous peoples reject 
the assertion that Big Pharma is not much of a threat.S7 
Other sources that exemplify the threat to Indigenous peoples in this area are 
universities and their researchers. Activists often cite the greed of the large corporate 
interests in pressing for the exploitation of Indigenous biological knowledge, but 
perhaps the larger pressures come from university researchers. Professor Barsh 
conducted a study of patents and scientific publications and concluded that "academic 
research in this field is growing, and more of it is being carried out by academics 
employed by institutions in developing countries."S8 
Moreover, the University of Minnesota,· for example, spent more than $1 
million the last five years on its wild rice research.s9 The White Earth Land Recovery 
Project and several tribes and tribal organizations have registered their opposition to 
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the University of Minnesota's continuing research on wild rice.60 No end to the 
research is likely, especially given that it is extremely likely that much of the funding 
for university research likely originates from Big Pharma and the federal government. 
II. CURRENT LEGAL PROTECTIONS FAIL TO PRESERVE INDIGENOUS BIOLOGICAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
Biopiracy may continue unabated because current legal regimes offer little or 
no protection for Indian communities attempting to preserve their Indigenous 
biological knowledge. 
A. Intellectual Property Regimes Fail 
The doctrines and rules that protect intellectual property usually fail Indigenous 
peoples. Indigenous biological knowledge is often held collectively, with individuals 
rarely "owning" the knowledge. As one intellectual property attorney noted: 
Copyright law is premised on individual rights and while it recognizes 
group rights (such as joint copyright) in certain circumstances, the 
bundle of rights that accompanies an artistic creation resides with the 
individual creator. In contrast, traditional or indigenous creations are 
not considered to be owned by the individual who created them, but 
rather by the group, tribe, clan, or community. Heritage is communal in 
nature and the individual's role is as a custodian or steward of such 
aspect of heritage. Works are produced for the benefit of the traditional 
group and the entire group, not the individual, controls its use. These 
individual responsibilities are different than "ownership" in the 
traditional sense.61 
Additionally, Dean Suagee noted that, since "the communal knowledge ... has been 
handed down through the . generations [,]"62 intellectual property regimes that protect 
property rights for a limited time do not assist Indigenous peoples.63 
B. International Law Fails 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention 
on Biological Diversity64 completed in Rio de Janeiro in· 1992 includes provisions 
intended to preserve Indigenous biological knowledge for the benefit of Indigenous 
peoples. Article 80) states: 
531 
HeinOnline -- 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 532 2004-2005
Fletcher 
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and appropriate: 
*** 
G) Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
commumtIes embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote 
their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders 
of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such 
knowledge, innovation and practices[.]65 
"Although the United States has ratified the convention, no steps have been taken thus 
far to implement its provisions on indigenous peoples. ,,66 However, as one 
commentator noted, "[t]he protection is subject to national legislation and does not 
require protection of [Indigenous] knowledge but merely 'respect.',,67 Nevertheless, 
after Article 8(j), "[t]he fossibility of protecting traditional knowledge and folklore is 
becoming legitimized.,,6 
In spite of the fact that the intent of this language appears to be to protect 
Indigenous communities from exploitation, the language itself is ambiguous right from 
the opening phrase. What does "[s]ubject to its national legislation" mean? Moreover, 
the description of Indigenous biological knowledge used here-as it is in other statutes 
and regulations-is indeterminate. 
c. Federal Government's View 
The American Indian tribes' trustee, the United States, has not been leading the 
charge to defend against the exploitation of Indigenous biological knowledge. The 
federal government has consistently argued that intellectual property regimes proposed 
in the international arena to preserve Indigenous biological knowledge should not 
validate collective rights over individual rights.69 
In 1999, the Department of Justice Environment and Natural Resources 
Division asked the Office of Legal Counsel to analyze the effect of the Indian Civil 
Rights Aceo on Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity.71 The question 
presented was whether an Indian tribe could validly restrict or prohibit the disclosure 
of Indigenous biological knowledge. In the opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, the 
answer depended on each tribe's individual and unique tribal jurisprudence.72 The 
Office made no effort whatsoever to research tribal case law, tribal constitutions, or 
tribal cultures and could come to no concrete conclusion.73 However, in the view of the 
authors, conventional, Anglo-American free speech jurisprudence should contro1.74 In 
large part, this Article seeks to examine the application of free speech to such 
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theoretical restrictions by tribal courts, a step the federal attorneys were unwilling or 
unable to take. 
III. FREE SPEECH IN TRIBAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
This Part details in chronological order of the eras of Indian civil rights. First, 
the Article notes that prior to the imposition of the Indian Civil Rights Act by 
Congress, tribes typically focused more on collective rights than individual rights. 
After the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act, but before the United States 
Supreme Court decided Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, federal courts took 
jurisdiction over many civil rights claims arising out of Indian Country and applied the 
Anglo-American concept of individual rights over collective rights. After Martinez, 
tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over these types of claims. Each tribal court 
applies civil rights protections in a manner consistent with each tribe's mores and 
values. 
A. The Indian Civil Rights Act 
Congress expressly and intentionally codified the unsettled tension between 
individual rights and group rights in tribal communities by enacting the Indian Civil 
Rights Act in 1968.75 Concerned that individual rights were receiving short shrift in 
tribal courts and by tribal governments,76 Congress chose to impose a modified form of 
the Bill of Rights on tribal governments.77 The tension between "traditional" and 
"establishment" Indians, for example, became formally codified in the Act -
"channelled [sic] into the legal system.,,78 In this vein, then, the tribal law of individual 
rights is entirely foreign, imposed from on high by the federal government - the 
conqueror, the guardian, the trustee.79 
Tribal law prior to the Indian Civil Rights Act, generally speaking, was much 
more oriented toward the rights of the group over the rights of the individual. 80 
Professor Riley succinctly described the legal paradigm of Indigenous peoples: 
Native peoples ... understand their place in the world as that of a 
people born into a network of group relations, and whose rights and 
duties in the community arise from, and exist entirely within, the 
context of the group. For these groups, one's clan, kinship; and family 
identities make up personal identity. The individual sees hislher rights 
and responsibilities as arising exclusively within the framework of such 
familial, social, and tribal networks. Rights are· part of group 
membership; individual rights exist in contemplation of how they may 
be suited to the larger political group.81 
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The kind of coercive, arbitrary, and violent government actions generated by Euro-
American governments - i.e., imprisonment, execution, police brutality, denial of 
governmental benefits and services, eminent domain, interrogation, entrapment, 
surveillance, quartering of soldiers, and so on - were rarely, if ever, perpetuated by 
Indian communities. Nevertheless, with the imposition - again, by the dominant 
government - of hierarchical tribal governments first, through the creation of 
leadership roles for the purpose of executing treaties and, second, through the creation 
of tribal governments as we know them today under the Indian Reorganization Act, the 
coercive, arbitrary, .and violent actions inherent in Euro-American governments began 
to manifest themselves in tribal governments. In short, ICRA is a half-baked federal 
compromise solution to a problem created by a series of previous half-baked federal 
compromise solutions. 
Scholarship contemporaneous to the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act 
focused much attention on the free speech rights of tribal members and nonmembers as 
regulated, qualified, or restricted by tribal governments. Some commentators argued 
strongly for "protection of the 'outside agitator'" in order to preserve pan-tribal 
"militant Indian movements.,,82 Others argued against tribes that imposed criminal 
penalties on individuals for charges such as "spreading malicious gossip" and 
"witchcraft.,,83 One critical argument was that individual Indians should be allowed 
greater leeway to criticize their government. 84 Other scholars argued, "The wisdom of 
affording [freedom of speech] protection to dissident members of closely knit tribes is 
questionable. Indian tribes being more like families than governmental units, the risk 
exists that barriers raised against 'intra-family' discipline could well lead to a further 
breakdown of tribal society .... ,,85 However, this scholarship focused only on the 
political implications of free speech in tribal societies.86 
But ICRA allows Indian tribes to decide for themselves what individual rights 
mean in each tribal community. The United States Supreme Court eliminated any 
chance for federal court review of tribal government actions under ICRA in 197887 
(after a decade of a mishmash of federal court decisions reviewing tribal government 
actions88). Moreover, "the legislative history makes clear that Congress found it 
necessary to impose a specially designed set of restraints upon tribal government ... 
operating within the structure of tribal government. ,,89 One influential commentary on 
the legislative history of ICRA written by Harvard law students sees "a literal reading 
of some of the provisions to mean 'the same standards as applied to state and federal 
governments' would result in seriously undermining the tribes' cultural autonomy, in 
some case threatening the tribes' capacity for survival in the long run.,,90 Prior to the 
Martinez decision, Alvin Ziontz pleaded with federal judges to recognize "[t]he need 
for Indian communities· to maintain their own values and concepts of fairness and 
justice to the fullest extent.,,91 The Harvard Note agreed, contending that, "[i]n 
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construing the statute, courts should remember that Congress has strongly supported 
the polic~ of allowing Indian tribes to maintain their governmental and cultural 
identity." 2 Congress ultimately did not intend for ICRA to be a tool of assimilation.93 
Despite these warnings and pleas, federal courts gave short shrift to tribal 
cultures in federal court decisions prior to Martinez relating to free speech rights and 
tribal governments. For example, in Dodge v. Nakai,94 the court took jurisdiction and 
ruled that the Navajo Tribe's expulsion of an attorney in charge of Dinebeiina Nahiilna 
Be Agaditahe, Inc., the reservation's legal aid office, violated the attorney's freedom of 
speech and constituted an unlawful bill of attainder.95 While the court acknowledged 
that the attorney had actually laughed at tribal leaders and tribal elders during a critical 
tribal leadership meeting - behavior the defendants argued was full of "ridicule and 
scorn" and "so obnoxious as to provoke an assault" by a tribal elder96 - the court ruled 
that the attorney's rights under ICRA had been violated and vacated the tribe's 
decision. Alvin Ziontz argued persuasively that the court's decision smacks of 
ethnocentrism: 
Unfortunately, the court gave no consideration to the significance such 
an act may have had to Indians. For a white man who had previously 
placed himself in defiance of tribal government to enter into the seat of 
government of that tribe, on their reservation and to laugh scornfully in 
the face of tribal government, may, within the culture of the Navajo 
tribe, constitute a grave transgression.97 
Ziontz concluded that "[t]he actions of the federal court in deciding that banishment 
was 'unreasonable' may reflect either mere ignorance of tribal values or a decision to 
reject those values in favor of Anglo-Saxon standards of acceptable conduct. ,,98 
Later, in Big Eagle v. Andera,99 the federal courts took jurisdiction under the 
habeas provision of ICRA 100 of a claim that a tribal law prohibiting disorderly conduct 
had been used to violate the free speech rights of tribal members. 101 The Eighth 
Circuit first opined· that the disorderly conduct statute appeared - "if tested by 
standards applied to communities outside an Indian reservation" - broad enough to 
include the exercise of free speech,102 but remanded the case back to the district 
court. 103 The district court then applied to· the tribal ordinance standards that would 
normally be applied off the reservation, noting that "[t]he tribal court is not a court of 
record."I04 Judge Bogue's district court found that the tribal court had allowed the 
disorderly conduct statute to be applied to individuals who merely swore at police 
officers or merely demanded their rights. 105 The court held that since the ordinance 
was used as a "catch-all" where "a confusing variety of words, acts, and human 
conditions have been found to be within its prohibitions," the ordinance was void for 
vagueness.106 The court also held, applying Anglo-American standards of free speech, 
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that the tribal court had not "required a finding that the speech was likely to arouse 
anger likely to cause physical retaliation.,,107 As such, the court declared that the 
ordinance violates the free speech guarantees of ICRA. 108 The federal courts did not 
seek an opinion from the tribal court. The federal courts frankly did not care what the 
opinion of the tribal court would have been. The federal court in Big Eagle II was hell-
bent to apply non-Indian law to strike down a tribal ordinance. 
Another example of federal courts applyinf Anglo-American conceptions of justice to tribal communities is Janis v. Wilson, 10 yet another decision from Judge 
Bogue. In Janis, several tribal employees who had been caught protesting against 
Dick Wilson's tribal governmentlIO while on the clock argued that the tribal ordinance 
prohibiting such conduct violated ICRA's free speech guarantees. 11 1 Judge Bogue first 
wrote what appears to be mere boilerplate regarding the differences between ICRA' s 
free speech guarantee and the First Amendment: "this Court is of the opinion that the 
meaning and application of 25 U.S.c. § 1302 to Indian tribes must necessarily be 
somewhat different than the established Anglo-American legal meaning and 
application of the Bill of Rights on federal and state govemments.,,112 Judge Bogue 
nevertheless relied exclusively on First Amendment jurisprudence in deciding that the 
ordinance did not violate the free speech guarantees of ICRA. 113 
Federal court decisions imposing Anglo-American conceptions of individual 
rights on tribal communities such as Dodge, Big Eagle, and Janis are now rare,1I4 with 
. . 115 
mmor exceptIOns. 
B. Tribal Law 
Tribal law develops daily and, since the federal courts will generally no longer 
hear civil rights claims brought under ICRA, it is appropriate to focus on modem tribal 
law relating to free speech. 
1. Tribal Constitutions 
Many tribal constitutions guarantee free speech rights in varying forms. Some 
tribes guarantee free speech even without the "state action" requirement imrosed by 
the First Amendment's language, "Congress shall make no law .... " 16 The 
Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon provides, "[a]l1 members 
of the Confederated Tribes may enjoy without hindrance, freedom of worship, speech, 
press and assembly.,,117 The Comanche Indian Tribe's constitution has nearly identical 
language: "[a]l1 members of the Comanche Indian Tribe shall enjoy without hindrance 
freedom of worship, conscience, speech, press, assembly and association." 11 8 The 
Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe's constitution similarly states, "no rerson shall be 
denied freedom of conscience, speech, association, or assembly .... " 19 Some tribes 
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limit this protection to tribal members. The Blackfeet Constitution states, "[a]ll 
members of the tribe may enjoy without hindrance freedom of worship, conscience, 
speech, press, assembly, and association.,,120 
Other tribal constitutions regulate only governmental conduct that would 
otherwise restrict speech. The Chickasaw Constitution provides, "[e]very citizen shall 
be at liberty to speak, write, or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible 
for the abuse of that privilege, and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of 
speech, or of the press."l2l Others substantially mirror the provisions contained in the 
Indian Civil Rights Act,122 while other tribes adopt ICRA' s provisions.123 Many tribal 
constitutions do not have constitutional protections relating to freedom of speech at 
all. 124 
Each tribe is unique and it follows that each tribe's speech rights jurisprudence 
will be different. As such, it is necessary to analyze what tribal court opinions exist 
regarding free speech claims. A review of tribal court decisions that are readily 
available on the subject of free speech in tribal law would be short but essential. 
2. Tribal Court Jurisprudence & Constitutional Law 
The real question, then, is how tribal courts will interpret these constitutions 
and statutes that facially restrict the speech rights of tribal members and others for the 
purpose of preserving tribal culture. 12 
Tribal courts have generally interpreted the provisions of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act in' accordance with the method recommended in 1969 by the leading 
commentary on the Act: "[u]nless the record shows a willingness to modify tribal life 
wherever necessary to impose ordinary constitutional standards, courts should take this 
legislation as a mandate to interpret statutory standards within the framework of tribal 
life.,,126 One tribal court follows a principle that, where no tribal "custom or tradition 
has been argued to be implicated .. , [tribal courts] will look to general U.S. 
constitutional principles, as articulated by federal and [state] courts, for guidance ... 
,,127 
The most critical element that tends to guide tribal court analysis of 
fundamental individual rights is whether the activity at issue is a distinctly Anglo-
American construct versus a traditional or cultural construct. For example, tribal 
courts are likely to apply federal constitutional law to decide a wrongful discharge 
claim 128 or an unlawful search and seizure claim as opposed to a tribal membership 
claim. 129 
In a theoretical circumstance contemplated here, what should be the standard of 
review by a tribal court determining the constitutionality of a tribal ordinance 
restricting the right of tribal members and nonmembers to export indigenous biological 
knowledge? This question necessarily implicates the more traditional and cultural law 
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analysis. In other words, federal and state constitutional, law based on Anglo-
American constructs is less likely to be persuasive to tribal courts. It is not clear at all 
whether a tribal court would articulate a two- or three-tiered scrutiny analysis of 
governmental action restricting a fundamental right. Each court can come to its own 
conclusion and for different reasons. 
Alvin Ziontz argued in 1975 that in analogous circumstances (where traditional 
and customary social and legal questions arise) the standard should be the rational 
basis test. 130 The standard of review may also depend on whether the individual 
involved is a tribal member or a nonmember. One commentary suggested that for 
nonmembers, the standard of review would be lenient: "an outsider seems to have 
minimal acknowledged interests in participating in or determining the development of 
the tribe.,,131 While' at least one tribal court has analyzed a free speech rights claim 
using the Anglo-American strict scrutiny/intermediate scrutiny/rational basis test 
continuum,132 it is no guarantee that tribal courts would follow this Anglo-American 
construct at all. 133 ' 
The following subparts describe tribal court cases exemplifying the broad 
spectrum of tribal courts' choice of law (federal, state, tribal law, or a combination 
thereof) and the application of that law. 
a. Applying Federal Law 
Since most free speech claims heard in tribal courts arise during the course, of 
employment or in the exercise of political rights, tribal courts most often aRply federal 
law as persuasive authority to decide these cases. In LaPorte v. Fletcher, 34 the tribal 
court rejected a freedom of speech challenge to an employee's demotion from chief of 
police and his challenge to a tribal statute that prohibited employees from making 
statements to the media regarding issues under negotiation. 135 The employee as chief 
of police had allegedly stated to a local newspaper that the tribe had entered into an 
agreement with a local sheriffs department when in fact the tribe had not. 136 Relyin~ 
on several federal cases,137 the court upheld the tribal statute138 and the demotion.13 
Most employment cases alleging free speech violations are dismissed by tribal courts 
for procedural reasons. 140 This opinion provided little or no analysis of the tribal-
specific circumstances that occasioned the enactment of the restriction in the first 
place, information that would have been useful to analyzing the circumstances in the 
manner prescribed by the cases cited. However, one of the cases relied upon heavily 
by' the tribal court was Gonzalez, where the Seventh Circuit held 'that speech made 
within the context of a citizen's employment as a police officer rarely is entitled to 
First Amendment protection,141 strongly suggesting that the tribal court did not see a 
valid free speech claim at all. As such, the standard of review applied by the court in 
LaPorte was generously in favor of the tribal employer. 
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In instances where an individual's speech rights as a candidate for tribal 
election are implicated, at least one court applied a sliding scale standard of review, 
choosing to apply intermediate scrutiny where the tribe imposed nondiscriminatory 
restrictions on candidate eligibility imposed to avoid a chaotic tribal caucus process. 
In Rave v. Reynolds,142 both the tribal court (Rave I) and the tribal supreme court 
(Rave II) relied· exclusively on federal constitutional· law to determine the 
constitutionality of a tribal statute that restricted the right of tribal members to attend 
more than one electoral caucus. 143 Even an unknowing violation of this rule by an 
individual other than an electoral candidate resulted in the removal of the candidate 
from the ballot. l44 Relying on two United States Supreme Co~rt cases that generally 
discussed the right to freedom of association in the national electoral context, the tribal 
court struck down the tribal statute. 145 On appeal, the tribal supreme court at least 
raised the possibility that tribal law or "special facts in the Winnebago tribal 
community" might counsel in favor of rejecting the application of Federal 
Constitutional law, but no party chose to assert alternative authority.146 The court then 
compared the tribal constitutional provision to the Indian Civil Rights Act provision 
dealing with free speech and concluded that "the language of these rights is virtually 
identical to the rights protected against federal governmental action under the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution.,,147 The tribal supreme court adopted the 
federal "sliding scale of scrutiny in election rights cases involving the right of political 
association depending on whether the election regulations in question severely burden 
political association rights or merely constitute 'reasonable nondiscriminatory 
restrictions.",148 As such, the appellate court applied "intermediate scrutiny," which 
required the government to prove an important governmental interest to justify the 
tribal statute. 149 Applying the "sliding scale" test and then "intermediate scrutiny," the 
court upheld the constitutionality of the tribal statute. ISO The court noted that the 
purpose of the rule was to prevent "the then common practice of tribal members going 
from caucus to caucus, thereby creating a disorderly election process.,,151 Since voters 
could still write-in the candidate removed from the ballot, the court held that the 
restriction was not severe enough to render the statute unconstitutional. 152 The tribal 
court adopted federal constitutional law as an analog but recognized the particular 
tribal election circumstances that provided the requisite important governmental 
interest. 
Tribal courts confronted with the claim that a tribal criminal statute had been 
used to restrict the speech activities of individuals apply the federal void-for-vagueness 
doctrine. In Hopi Tribe v. Lonewolf Scott,153 a case involving claims analogous to the 
claims brought in Big Eagle v. Andera,154 the Hogi Tribal Court upheld a tribal 
ordinance prohibiting "injury to public proJ?erty.,,1 In that case, the defendants 
argued, as the Big Eagle defendants argued,1 6 that the tribal law enforcement officials 
used the statute as a catch-all that operated to "include their alleged criminal activity 
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within the penumbra of constitutionally protected speech and conduct.,,157 However, 
unlike the Big Eagle defendants, the defendants in Lonewolf Scott had engaged in 
actions that "constituted civil disobedience that resulted in physical damage and was 
not conduct that may be construed as protected or within constitutional protection.,,158 
The tribal court based its conclusion on the federal district court's analysis in Big 
Eagle. 159 
b. Applying State Law 
Occasionally, tribal courts apply the law of the state where the tribe is located 
as persuasive authority. In Chase v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise,160 the 
court warned the tribal gaming enterprise that it should be "extremely careful when 
seeking to regulate their employees' off-duty conduct so as to not infringe upon the 
employee's right to free speech.,,161 The court cited a Connecticut statute as an 
example of a law that would support an employee's right to off-duty free speech as 
long as that exercise '''does not substantially or materially interfere with the 
employee's bona fide job performance .... ",162 Like the LaPorte court, this opinion 
provided little information useful in analyzing the purposes of the restriction. Another 
case, Gwin v. BoZman,163 exemplified a circumstance where a tribe chose to import 
state law into its election laws, and the tribal court applied state and federal free speech 
jurisprudence in construing the statute. l64 
c. Influenced by Tribal Customary or Traditional Law 
Other cases exemplify a tribal court's nod to federal law, but where the results 
change depending on the sometimes unspoken influence of tribal customary or 
traditional law. The standard of review changes depending on the tribe's collective 
interest, as opposed to the tribe's governmental interest. Federal courts, in contrast, are 
unable and unqualified to determine the collective interest of the American public, 
whereas tribal courts are in the unique position, not only to have authority to invoke 
collective rights, but the capability to do so as well. 
Tribal courts apply a reduced standard of review on restrictions on the behavior 
of elected tribal leaders. One case, Brandon v. Tribal Council,165 is an example where 
a tribal court relies almost exclusively on federal law but issued an opinion contrary to 
what federal constitutional law scholars would have expected in an analogous federal 
case. 166 In Brandon, the tribal council suspended one tribal council member who had 
made a "vulgar" statement during a public meeting for three months in accordance 
with a tribal statute that prohibited tribal council members from behaving in a manner 
that would bring discredit or disrespect to the tribe. 167 The tribal court noted that tribal 
leaders had a restricted right of expression, stating, "Being a tribal councilmember [sic] 
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is a privilege, not a right, and councilmembers should be expected to conduct 
themselves at a higher level of restraint than other tribal members.,,168 The court 
adopted a form of the strict scrutiny standard of review, find that "[ w ] hen there is a 
valid and compelling reason, a governmental body is free to ban certain expressions or 
conduct on the part of its citizens. These reasons may include prohibiting obscenity or 
'fighting words' or phrases likely to result in a violent reaction by the person 
addressed." 169 The court then found a "compelling" reason for the statute, based in 
part on tribal traditions: 
The Grand Ronde Tribe has compelling reasons to have interpreted the 
ordinance so as to limit the vulgar language that may be uttered by 
councilmembers [sic] in public ... [T]he Tribe has the right to expect its 
councilmembers to conduct themselves in public with dignity and 
respect, and refrain from using words or phrases that a normal tribal 
member is privileged to use. Secondly, the type of language used by 
Mr. Brandon was arguably 'fighting words' that were likely to create a 
violent or hostile situation, as indeed was created here. The tribe has a 
right to expect its tribal councilmemnbers to refrain from using such 
language so as to avoid fights or other altercations. Finally, the Grand 
Ronde Tribe has a vested interest in protecting its reputation throughout 
the community.I70 
The Brandon court created a doctrine of free speech that applied only to the tribe's 
elected officials. Finding that preserving the reputation of the tribe through the 
regulation of the expression of the tribe's leaders was a compelling governmental 
interest, the court saw no need to engage in discussing whether the statute was 
narrowly tailored to accomplish that goal while preserving free speech rights as much 
as possible, unlike the Rave II court. A tribe's reputation in business and inter-
governmental negotiation is directly related to the quality and behavior of its elected 
leaders. As Professor Mark Rosen noted, the court appeared to be adopting an analog 
of the federal doctrine that validly restricts the expression of federal employees. 171 But 
the tribal court issued a decision that appeared to strongly imply the critical role that 
tribal leaders play in representing the tribe in tribal meetings, in government-to-
government negotiations, and in business relationships. 
The factual converse of the Brandon decision is likely Flute v. Labelle. In 
There, an elected tribal leader who was the subject of an unflatteriny; letter to the editor 
of the local newspaper sued the author of the letter for defamation. 73 The tribal court 
applied federal and South Dakota constitutional law in analogI74 and found that the 
plaintiff s petition met the requirements of libel per quOd. I75 Since the plaintiff could 
not show actual damages, the court awarded only nominal damages and ordered the 
541 
HeinOnline -- 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 542 2004-2005
Fletcher 
defendant to "write a retraction letter to the Tribal newspaper correcting the false 
impression she left with readers .... ,,176 The court noted the political history of the 
defendant in particular, stating that she had been "one of many persons who several 
years ago engaged in a protest of tribal council action by occupying the Tribal Council 
chambers after a Council meeting ended.,,177 In short, the court applied federal and 
state common law in analog that established the defendant's culpability, but applied 
that law to fashion a tribe-specific remedy that severely limited the defendant's 
liability. " 
In a case with many of the same circumstances, Chavez v. Tome,178 the Navajo 
Nation Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's decision finding liability in libel for the 
publication of false statements about an attorney employed by the Navajo Nation. 179 
Unlike the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate Court in Flute, the Navajo Nation applied federal 
free speech jurisprudence to prohibit the lower court from ordering the publisher from 
printing a retraction. 180 
d. Applying Tribal Traditional or Customary Law 
Other tribal courts often express no hesitation in examining a free speech claim 
using traditional or customary law, even in an" em~loyment context. The Navajo 
Nation Supreme Court in Navajo Nation v. Crockett 81 held that Navajo courts apply 
"Navajo common law to determine whether an individual's right to free speech has 
been violated.,,182 The general rule is: 
[Navajo common law] that an individual ~as a fundamental right to 
express his or her mind by way of spoken word and/or actions. As a 
matter of Navajo custom" and tradition, people speak with caution and 
respect, choosing their words carefully to avoid harm to others. This is 
nothing mo~e than freedom with responsibility, a fundamental Navajo 
traditional principle. 183 . 
The Navajo court discussed how Navajo customary law includes certain restrictions on 
free speech, such as, "[f]or example, on some occasions, a person is prohibited from 
making certain statements, and some statements of reciting oral traditions are 
prohibited during certain times of the year.,,184 Additional restrictions include how 
speech should be delivered and, in conflict situations, to whom: 
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arguments be resolved by "talking things out." This process of "talking 
things out," called hoozhoojigo, allows each member of the group to 
cooperate and talk about how to resolve a problem. This requirement 
places another limitation on speech, which is that a disgruntled person 
must speak directly with the person's relative about his or her concerns 
before seeking other avenues of redress with strangers. 18S 
Applying these rules to a circumstance where a Navajo government employee has a 
complaint with a supervisor, the Navajo court invoked "the Navajo common law of 
nalyeeh" and advised employees to "not seek to correct the person by summoning the 
coercive powers of a powerful person or entity, but should seek to correct the wrongful 
action by 'talking things out. ",186 The court concluded that if this process failed, the 
employee could then resort to sw.eaking to strangers, i.e., by accessing "an internal 
employment grievance process.,,1 7 The court noted that, even within the employment 
grievance process, "the traditional rules of respect, honesty, and kinship apply.,,188 
In Crockett, the Navajo Nation fired an employee for, as alleged by the 
employee, speaking at a government meeting about alleged government misconduct 
and distributing documents that supported the allegations of government 
miscohduct. 189 The court held that this speech was protected by Navajo law by 
apparentl~ carving a "public concern" exception to the law of hoozhoojigo and 
nalyeeh.1 0 While not explicitly noting an exception, the court noted that "an initial 
inquiry with management to 'talk things out' is [merely] encouraged," 191 not 
mandated. The court also stated, "When an employee gives a statement before an 
official government committee, he or she speaks in a context that is inherently ~ublic 
in nature. This includes any documents which the employee may distribute.,,1 2 As 
such, though it appeared that the employees had not specifically attempted to 'talk 
things out' prior to surprising the governmental body in a public meeting with the 
allegations, the court still found the speech protected, in large part, because of the 
importance of the information to the public: 
This Court finds the speech in question was "a matter of public 
concern." At the meeting, the employees expressed safety and 
environmental concerns, undue interference by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs in P.L. 96-638 contracts, and allegations and misconduct on the 
part of ... management. The disclosure of misconduct or malfeasance 
by a government entity is a matter of public concern, as are questions of 
effectiveness and composition of the ... management board. Likewise, 
safety and environmental concerns have the potential to directl~ impact 
the general public, and therefore, are a matter of public interest. 93 
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In this case, the Navajo court came to the same conclusion an Anglo-American court 
likely would have reached, but took a far different route. By comparison, in a much 
earlier case, a Navajo court of appeals followed federal law exclusively in striking 
down a tribal statute prohibiting "unlawful assembly.,,194 
Some tribal courts provide additional tribe-specific reasons for restricting or 
otherwise rewarding speech. In Garcia v. Greendeer-Lee/95 the Ho-Chunk Supreme 
Court rejected a clajm by a nonmember employee of the Ho-Chunk Nation that the 
tribe's personnel policies violated her right to choose her own religion. 196 The 
emplorsee, a Jehovah's Witness, sought paid leave for the time she attended a religious 
event. 97 The tribe's Waksig Wogsa Leave Policy allowed for paid leave for 
attendance of certain tribe-specific religious events, but only unpaid leave for other 
events. 198 The court majority found that the em~loyee was not prohibited from 
participating in her religion and rejected the claim. 1 9 The interesting portion of the 
opinion came in a concurring opinion of the court's chief justice. Interpreting the 
phrase, Waksig Wags a, to mean "Indian Ways," and noting that the purpose of the 
leave policy was to "'provide a means in which enrolled Tribal member employees can 
practice religion, culture and tradition ... without the threat of losing a job or losing 
pay. ",200 Finding that the practice of these "Indian Ways" is both "the essence of tribal 
sovereignty" and "the backbone of cultural support that makes us distinctly Ho-
Chunk,,,201 the chief justice had no problem rejecting the constitutional challenge. 
Here, the chief judge viewed tribal member religious activities as fundamental to the 
survival of the tribe and its sovereignty, surely a compelling governmental interest. 
In short, tribal courts have no obligation to apply federal and state 
constitutional law as it relates to free speech. Some tribal courts apply strict, 
intermediate, or rational basis scrutiny, while others do not. Some courts rely heavily 
on tribal customary or traditional law while others rely less. However, depending on 
the strength or intensity of the customary or traditional interest in the free speech 
restriction, tribal courts are more likely to invoke tribal customary or traditional law. If 
a legal dispute involving a uniquely tribal practice, tradition, art, or custom arises, it is 
far more likely (and reasonable, if not desirable) for a tribal court to apply traditional 
or customary law. 
IV. PRESERVATION OF INDIGENOUS BIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AS A COMPELLING 
OR IMPORTANT TRIBAL GOVERNMENT INTEREST 
A. Theoretical Tribal Enactments to Limit Export of Indigenous Biological 
Knowledge 
At least a few researchers and scientists acknowledge the "the history of 
oppression and mistrust to which Native peoples accurately refer when considering 
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new relationships with Euro-Americans. Historically, altruism has not proven to be a 
two-way street in many Native Americans' interactions with Euro-Americans.,,202 
The Governor of the A:shiwi (Zuni Indian Tribe) argued in 2002 that the "Zuni 
people rely on ... the Zuni Tribal Council[] to guide, direct and mediate all facets of 
our Zuni Indian Nation. [T]he tribal council is entrusted with the protection and 
welfare of our people, resources, and lands.,,203 The Zuni Pueblo, for example, asserts 
that "the tribe owns the data, results and manuscripts prior to publication or 
presentation. ,,204 
The most developed proposal to govern the ex~ort of Indigenous biological 
knowledge is entitled, "Model Tribal Research Code,,2 5 (hereinafter Code). Section 
006 of the Code would criminally prohibit research "with respect to materials wherever 
located as to which the __ Tribe has a legal or equitable claim of intellectual or 
cultural ownership .... ,,206 While this Code provision appears to be patently void for 
vagueness,207 it also raises a question germane to the issues raised in this Article -
whether such a provision would be violative of person's freedom of speech under tribal 
law. 
Tribal legislatures could also enact much stricter prohibitions against the 
disclosure, dissemination, or export of Indigenous biological knowledge from Indian 
communities by both tribal members and nonmembers.208 They could also enact 
statutes calling for the removal of nonmembers from the reservation for violations of 
tribal law. In fact, as Alvin Ziontz noted, "[T]he exclusion power may well be the only 
way a tribe can deal with a non-Indian whose conduct is offensive, particularly if it has 
no jurisdiction over non-Indians in tribal courtS.,,209 
Some commentators have cautioned that tribal restrictions on the disclosure and 
publication of Indigenous biological knowledge that "the effort to censor the date and 
the commentary that flow out of scientific research is generally rnisbegotten.,,210 
Censorship rightfully brings up the question of whether scientists' and other researchers 
have a First Amendment right to publish and disclose their findings. This Article, 
however, is concerned solely with the question of whether an Indian tribe can lawfully 
prohibit or restrict the flow of Indigenous biological information - essentially a 
restraint on free speech. 
According to the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, the 
answer to whether tribal restrictions on the disclosure of Indigenous biological 
knowledge are unconstitutional depends on several factors: 
In particular, the analysis could tum on who holds the information that 
the tribe seeks to protect; whether those who hold the information have 
a particular relationship of trust with the tribe; the magnitude of the 
tribal interest underlying the tribe's effort not to disclose the 
information; and whether the information in question can be viewed as 
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tribal property under an intellectual property rights regime that is 
otherwise consistent with applicable law.211 
This legal opinion presumes too many facts to be persuasive, including a presumption 
that Indian tribes are analogous to municipal governments or corporations.z12 But the 
opinion correctly concludes that only each individual tribe can make a determination as 
to the constitutionality of its statutes restricting the export of Indigenous biological 
knowledge. 
B. Application of Tribal Law 
The question, then, is do tribal governments have a compelling, important, or 
rational governmental interest in restricting the speech rights of tribal members and 
nonmembers? 
1. Collective Identity as a Compelling Interest 
Indian tribal governments can make a very strong case that the preservation of 
Indigenous biological knowledge is an extremely compelling governmental interest. As 
Professor Riley established, "tribal people ... define their individual identity largely 
based on their identification with the group. '" For individuals within these distinct 
groups, flourishing in the world as a person is intimately related to cultural identity.,,213 
Relinquishing the group rights over Indigenous biological knowledge in favor of the 
individual right to export (and exploit) such knowledge would portend the end of a 
tribe's identity and even existence. Professor Riley continues: 
But identity for tribal peoples reaches further, to form a forceful nexus 
between the group and its cultural property. For a tribe, the authority to 
control that property is essential for group survival, as it links its very 
existence to group creations. Cultural property situates indigenous 
people[s] in a historical context, tying them to a place from which they 
came and the point of their creation. Tribal members become linked to 
the goods of the tribe - turtle rattles, trickster narratives, religious 
bundles - often resulting in a commitment to the objects outside of 
themselves; this commitment is the Native peoples' definition of what 
life is about.214 
Professor Riley's argument applies to Indigenous biological knowledge as well as to 
cultural property, establishing the key relationship between community identity and 
group rights and how individual rights often have lesser importance. 
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Professor Riley's view is consistent with the point of view of Indians and 
tribes. Indian tribes are much more than merely governments. Tribes are, without 
limitation, social organizations, family structures, community social control 
mechanisms, and protectors of tribal culture, tribal law, tribal sovereignty, both 
individual and collective fundamental rights, and both individual and collective 
property rights. And because tribal members have greater and greater confidence in 
and expectations of their tribal governments,215 these additional responsibilities acquire 
a greater importance. 
Of importance also is the fact that tribal cultures are usually oral cultures. 
Restrictions on free speech take on a different meaning in this mixture of group rights 
over individual rights in predominantly oral cultures. Professor Barsh notes the critical 
relationship between speech and tribal culture and identity: 
The role of language in caring for country cannot be over-stated. 
Ecological knowledge, the stories embedded in places, place-names, 
and their meanings, and the key logical relationships between place-
names, family names, family chronicles, ceremonies, and ecological 
processes - are documented in indigenous peoples' languages.216 
On the surface it would seem that the restrictipn of speech in an oral culture would be 
anathema, but the link between the group right to Indigenous biological knowledge to 
preserve the identity of the community and the method of comn:mnication is actually a 
strong argument for limiting the export of such speech, comnmnication, knowledge, 
and so on. Certain tribal ceremonies are linked to very specific landmarks, landmarks 
often open to the public, so much so that the tribe has a very strong interest in keeping 
the ceremonies practically secret.217 Restrictions on the exportation of this knowledge 
are essential to its preservation?18 Tribal restrictions on the exportation of this type of 
knowledge are essential to tribal governments, especially because federal and state 
laws simply do not cover the contingencies of non-Indian tourism and scholarly 
research. Simple curiosity about Indigenous knowledge may be the tool that ultimately 
destroys that knowledge. 
This interest is consistent with other speech restrictions imposed by tribal 
governments. The charge of "spreading malicious gossip," for instance, is to prevent 
"the ever present possibility of divisive factionalism breaking out between members of 
a close homogeneous group.,,219 "Social harmony,,,220 then, is a compelling 
government interest for Indian tribes. One commentator in favor of advancing a free 
speech agenda in tribal law grudgingly acknowledged, "The amount of social 
disorganization among Indian ~oups appears to rise in proportion to the breakdown of 
social order within the tribe." 21 More fundamental than simply preserving civility is 
the fact that Indian tribes are far more than mere governments, as noted earlier. 
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Indian tribes maintain an extremely strong interest in maintaining traditional 
ways. Just as the high rate of suicide of young Indians removed from the reservation to 
grow up in non-Indian homes and communities suggests,222 tribes have a compelling 
interest both in preserving tribal culture and knowledge for living members, but they 
also have a compelling interest in preserving tribal culture and knowledge for future 
generations. 
2. Intergenerational Justice as a Compelling Interest 
Preserving Indigenous biological knowledge supports a second compelling or 
important tribal governmental interest - "intergenerational justice.,,223 In a way, both 
past and future generations have standing to assert rights in tribal courts (through the 
spokespersons of the present) and "[p]reserving the divine nature of cultural works and 
sheltering them from the market demonstrates Indian respect for those who have 
walked on, and sets the work aside for use and honor by future generations.,,224 
There is a compelling governmental interest in restricting the export of 
Indigenous biological knowledge. While the paradigm of group rights over individual 
rights rarely appears in modem tribal court decisions, in this area of the law so 
inherently related to the future of Indian tribes and the identity of individual Indians, I 
foresee tribal courts upholding the constitutionality of these theoretical restrictions?25 
The establishment of these compelling (or important) tribal governmental 
interests would "necessarily imply an extremely narrow application of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act where there is a showing of countervailing customary tribal values, beliefs 
or standards[.],,226 Alvin Ziontz reached a similar conclusion two decades ago 
concerning the power and right of tribes to exclude certain persons. He would impose a 
rational basis test: "Tribes should have the right to exclude outsiders under appropriate 
ordinances with standards bearing a reasonable relationship to the preservation of 
peace and harmony within the community.,,227 
As a matter of history, "[a]n Indian reservation must be seen as an ethnic 
community banded together under the pressure of being surrounded by an alien 
society, given ownership of compact geographical areas, and allowed a great measure 
of self-government. Separation has been fostered by the desire to retain-and has in 
tum fostered the retention of-a traditional culture.,,228 Given the enormous and 
quantifiable destruction visited upon Indian tribes that suffer the loss of their culture, it 
is often the only acceptable course for a tribe to take action to prevent this loss and it 
obliges tribal courts to uphold that choice. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
Whether a tribal law prohibiting the export of indigenous biological knowledge 
from Indian Country is viable or wise remains to be seen and is outside the scope of 
this paper. If nothing else, this Article is intended to reinvigorate debate and analysis 
on the subject of free speech in tribal law , a subject that has had little discussion in the 
scholarly literature since the years immediately following the enactment of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act in 1968. 
Migwetch. 
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